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I. INTRODUCTION
The American populace is aging.' At the same time, modern
medicine enables Americans to remain productive members of the
workforce for a longer period of time.2 The confluence of these two
1. As one author ominously announced, "Last year [1996], the baby boomers... officially
entered middle age when the eldest among them started turning 50." Lisa Stansky, New Age
Woes, 83 A.BA. J., Jan. 1997, at 66.
2. "By the year 2000, boomers will account for more than 70 million workers (49.2
percent of the work force). By 2004, the youngest turn 40, the magic number for protection
under [the ADEA]." Id. at 67; see also Ron Stodghill II, The Coming Job Bottleneck: What an
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trends augurs increased use of the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act ("ADEA7), 3 as companies try to force aging employ-
ees to retire despite their prolonged productivity.4
Another trend within the past decade has been the rise of
various hybrid corporate forms that combine the beneficial aspects of
partnerships and corporations, one example of which is the limited
liability company ("LLC").5 This increase in the number of different
Aging Workforce Means for Everyone Else, Bus. WK., Mar. 24, 1997, at 184 (discussing the
implications of "America's demographic reality[, that] tilts workforce is growing old").
3. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-34 (1994).
4. "[Flor employers hoping to ease [baby boomers] out of the marketplace over the next
two decades, [the aging of the populace] boils down to just one word: litigation. Yesterday's
rebels could easily turn into tomorrow's age discrimination plaintiffs ... ." Stansky, supra note
1, at 66. The recent trend toward mandatory retirement policies exacerbates the problem. For
an example of this trend in law firms, many of which organize as LLCs, see Paul M. Barrett,
Sixtysomething Lawyer Gets a Fresh Start, WALL ST. J., Feb. 6, 1997, at B1. Barrett details the
ordeal of 65-year-old Richard Levy, a prominent partner at Kirkland & Ellis. The firm enforced
against Levy its rule that 65-year-olds relinquish their lucrative partnership status or leave.
The author noted that only recently have law firms enforced retirement rules, attributing the
change to an increase in the emphasis on the bottom line, as law firms manage themselves more
like businesses. See id In addition, many firms greatly expanded in size in the late 1960s and
early 1970s, creating an unusually large number of partners who are now hitting their sixties.
See id.
5. An LLC is "a type of firm that combines partnership-type default rules with corporate-
type limited liability." Larry E. Ribstein, Possible Futures for Unincorporated Firms, 64 U. CIN.
L. REV. 319, 319 (1996). Between 1990 and 1994, "forty-nine of the fifty-one United States juris-
dictions adopted LLC statutes. Texas further complicated the picture in 1992 by inventing the
limited liability partnership ("LLP") .... Since 1992, 40 jurisdictions have adopted LLP
provisions." Id. at 319-20. For further data on the formation of LLCs and other business
entities in selected states, see Larry E. Ribstein, Statutory Forms for Closely Held Firms, 73
WASH. U. L.Q. 369 (1995).
Whether the LLC will be supplanted by other "hybrid" business forms is questionable. The
most obvious candidate is the LLP. A related and even newer entity is the limited liability
limited partnership ("LLLP"). Because both are general partnerships in almost every respect,
however, general partnership law will likely apply. Presumably, then, courts will apply the
partnership exemption to LLPs and LLLPs with the same frequency as they do to general
partnerships, though that topic is beyond the scope of this Note, which deals only with LLCs.
Since 1992, 40 jurisdictions have adopted LLP provisions. These include Arizona (codified in
scattered sections of ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 29-103 to 29-257 (West Supp. 1996)); California
(CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 15047-15058 (West Supp. 1997)); Colorado (codified in scattered sections of
COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 7-60-102 to 7-62-1104 (West Supp. 1997)); Connecticut (codified in
scattered sections of CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 34-40 to 34-81z (West Supp. 1997)); Delaware
(codified in scattered sections of DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, §§ 1502-1552, 17-214 (Supp. 1996));
District of Columbia (codified in scattered sections of D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 41-101 to 41-148 (Supp.
1997)); Florida (codified in scattered sections of FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 620.78-.789 (West Supp.
1997)); Georgia (codified in scattered sections of GA. CODE ANN. §§ 14-8-2 to 14-8-64 (Supp.
1997)); Idaho (codified in scattered sections of IDAHO CODE §§ 53-302 to 53-343C (Supp. 1997));
Illinois (codified in scattered sections of 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. 205/2 to 205/40 (West Supp.
1997)); Indiana (codified in scattered sections of IND. CODE ANN. §§ 23-4-1-2 to 23-4-1-52 (Michie
Supp. 1995)); Iowa (codified in scattered sections of IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 486.2-.46 (West Supp.
1997)); Kansas (codified in scattered sections of KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 17-2708, 17-706, 56-302 to
56-347, 56-1a102 (1994-1995 & Supp. 1996)); Kentucky (codified in scattered sections of KY.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 275.015, §§ 362.155-.605 (Michie 1996)); Louisiana (codified in scattered
sections of LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 9:3431-:3435, 12:117 (West 1994 & Supp. 1997)); Maryland
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types of corporate entities presents many problems, including the
application of statutes, like the ADEA, created long before the advent
of the various corporate forms. Facing the same discrimination expe-
rienced by some of their peers in more traditional corporate entities,
aggrieved aging members of LLCs will soon enter courtrooms to claim
ADEA protection. While these complainants will argue they are
employees for purposes of the ADEA,6 the companies will likely re-
spond that the unique structure of the LLC makes the members de
facto partners,7 or employers, with no standing to sue under the Act.
This Note attempts to give courts the tools necessary to ad-
dress this approaching dilemma. The second Part of this Note de-
scribes the rise of the hybrid corporate form, paying particular atten-
tion to the structure of the LLC. In addition, it provides a background
for discussing conflicting judicial attempts to define "employee" for
purposes of the ADEA. Part III examines decisions affecting the
standing of principals in different types of business organizations. In
doing so, it points out the effect of choosing to emphasize corporate
(codified in scattered sections of MD. CODE ANN., Bus. OCC. & PROF. § 1-101 (Supp. 1997) and
MD. CODE ANN., CORPS. & ASS'NS §§ 1-203 to 10-102 (Supp. 1997)); Massachusetts (MASS. GEN.
LAWS ANN. ch. 108A, §§ 1-49 (West Supp. 1997)); Michigan (codified in scattered sections of
MICH. ComP. LAWS ANN. §§ 449.15-.48 (West Supp. 1997)); Minnesota (codified in scattered
sections of MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 319A.02-.12, 323.02-323.47 (West 1995-1996 & Supp. 1997));
Mississippi (codified in scattered sections of MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 79-12-3 to 79-12-119 (1996 &
Supp. 1997)); Missouri (codified in scattered sections of MO. ANN. STAT. §§ 358.020-.510 (West
Supp. 1997)); Montana (codified in scattered sections of MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 35-10-102 to
35-10-710 (1995)); Nevada (codified in scattered sections of NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 87.020-.560
(Michie 1994 & Supp. 1995)); New Jersey (codified in scattered sections of N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 42:1-2 to 42:1-49 (West Supp. 1997)); New Mexico (codified in scattered sections of N.M. STAT.
ANN. §§ 54-lA-101 to 54-IA-1206 (Michie Supp. 1997)); New York (codified in scattered sections
of N.Y. PARTNERSHIP LAw §§ 2-71, 121-1500 to 121-1504 (McKinney Supp. 1997)); North
Carolina (codified in scattered sections of N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 55B-9, 59-32 to 59-84.3 (1995 &
Supp. 1997)); North Dakota (codified in scattered sections of N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 45-22-01 to
45-22-27 (Supp. 1997)); Ohio (codified in scattered sections of OIO REV. CODE ANN.
§§ 1775.05-1777.03 (West 1994)); Oregon (OR. REv. STAT. §§ 68.670-.790 (Supp. 1997));
Pennsylvania (codified in scattered sections of 15 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 8201-8221 (1995));
South Carolina (codified in scattered sections of S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 33-41-20 to 33-41-1210 (Law.
Co-op. Supp. 1996)); South Dakota (codified in scattered sections of S.D. CODIFIED LAWS
§§ 48-1-1 to 48-7-111 (Michie Supp. 1997)); Tennessee (codified in scattered sections of TENN.
CODE ANN. §§ 61-1-101 to 61-1-147 (Supp. 1997)); Texas (codified in scattered sections of TEX.
REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 6132a-1 to art. 6132b-10.04 (West Supp. 1997)); Utah (codified in
scattered sections of UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 48-1-1 to 48-1-48 (Supp. 1997)); Virginia (codified in
scattered sections of VA. CODE ANN. §§ 50-43.1 to 50-73.78, 54.1-3902 (Michie 1996 & Supp.
1997)); Washington (codified in scattered sections of WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 25.04.700-.750
(Supp. 1997)); Wisconsin (WIS. STAT. ANN. §§ 178.01-.53 (West Supp. 1997)). See generally ALAN
R. BROMBERG & LARRY E. RBBSTEIN, BROMBERG & RIBSTEIN ON LIMITED LIABILITY
PARTNERSHIPS AND THE REVISED UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP ACT (1997).
6. The ADEA prohibits age discrimination in employment relationships. See infra notes
22-25 and accompanying text (introducing the basic purpose and application of the ADEA).
7. Specifically, employers will argue for application of the partnership exemption. For a
description of this doctrine, see infra note 30 and accompanying text.
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form or economic reality. By exploring the economic reality of the
* LLC as well as the nature of the ADEA itself, Part IV attempts to
determine how courts should treat members of an LLC under the
ADEA. Part V concludes that LLC members, as well as most princi-
pals, should be deemed employers as partners have been.
Consequently, they should lack standing to sue under the ADEA.
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. Limited Liability Companies: Advent of the Hybrid
Corporate Form
Before the advent of hybrid business organizations such as the
LLC, professional groups, including those consisting of lawyers, doc-
tors, and accountants, organized themselves mostly as partnerships.
While the partnership form offered favorable tax treatment and ease
of management,8 it also required that all partners be jointly and sev-
erally liable for all of the partnership's obligations.9 As a result, when
malpractice claims dramatically increased in the" 1980s, professional
groups petitioned state legislatures for an alternative organizational
form. In particular, these groups sought to limit their vicarious
liability while preserving their favorable tax treatment. 0
State legislatures responded by creating the LLC. 1" As no
other statutory business form had previously done, the LLC offered
8. See CHARLES R. O'KELLEY, JR. & ROBERT B. THOMPSON, CORPORATIONS AND OTHER
BuSiNESS ASSOCIATIONS 61-65 (2d ed. 1996) (discussing the features of general partnerships).
9. See id.
10. For an extensive discussion of the impetus for new hybrid forms like LLCs and LLPs,
see id. at 67-71. See generally Robert B. Thompson, The Taming of Limited Liability
Companies, 66 U. COLO. L. REV. 921 (1995).
11. Wyoming enacted an LLC statute in 1977, and Florida did likewise in 1982. When the
Internal Revenue Service ("IRS") ruled in 1988 that LLCs could qualify for taxation as a part-
nership, other states followed suit and enacted similar LLC statutes. See Rev. Rul. 88-76, 1988-
2 C.B. 360, 361. All 50 states have enacted LLC statutes, with Vermont and Hawaii being the
last to do so. See ALA. CODE § 10-12-1 (Supp. 1996); ALASKA STAT. § 10.50.010 (Michie 1996);
ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 29-601 (West Supp. 1996); ARM CODE ANN. § 4-32-101 (Michie 1996);
CAL. CORP. CODE § 17000 (West Supp. 1997); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 7-80-101 (West Supp.
1997); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 34-100 (West Supp. 1997); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-101
(Supp. 1996); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 608.401 (West Supp. 1997); GA. CODE ANN. § 14-11-100 (1994);
HAW. REV. STAT. § 428-101 (Supp. 1996); IDAHO CODE § 53-601 (1994); 805 ILL. COMP. STAT.
ANN. 180/1-1 (West Supp. 1997); IND. CODE ANN.§ 23-18-1-1 (Michie Supp. 1997); IOWA CODE
ANN. § 490A.100 (Supp. 1997); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-7601 (Supp. 1996); KY. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 275.001 (Michie Supp. 1996); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:1301 (West 1994); ME. REV. STAT. ANN.
tit. 31, § 601 (West 1996); Mn. CODE ANN., CORPS. & ASSNS § 4A-101 (Supp. 1997); MASS. GEN.
LAWS ANN. ch. 156C, § 1 (West Supp. 1997); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 450.4101 (West Supp.
432 [Vol. 51:429
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limited liability with respect to third-parties,12 favored pass-through
tax treatment,3 and flexible governance rules. The LLC, therefore, is
1997); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 322B.01 (West 1995); Miss. CODE ANN. § 79-29-101 (1996); Mo. ANN.
STAT. § 347.010 (West Supp. 1997); MONT. CODE ANN. § 35-8-101 (Smith 1995); NEB. REV. STAT.
§ 21-2601 (Supp. 1996); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 86.011 (Michie Supp. 1995); N.H. REv. STAT.
ANN. § 304-C:1 (1995); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 42:2B-1 (West Supp. 1997); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 53-19-1
(Michie 1996); N.Y. LTD. LIAB. Co. LAW § 101 (McKinney 1997); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 57C-1-01
(1993); N.D. CENT. CODE § 10-32-01 (West 1995); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1705 (West 1994);
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 2000 (West Supp. 1997); OR. REV. STAT. § 63.951 (Supp. 1996); 15
PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 8901 (Supp. 1997); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 7-16-1 (1992); S.C. CODE ANN.
§ 33-43-101 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1996); S.D. CODFIED LAws § 47-34-1 (Michie 1997); TENN. CODE
ANN. § 48-201-101 (Supp. 1994); TEL REV. Cr. STAT. ANN. art. 1528n (West 1997); UTAH CODE
ANN. § 48-2b-101 (Supp. 1997); VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-1000 (Michie Supp. 1997); VT. STAT. ANN.
tit. 11, §§ 3001-3154 (1997); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 25.15.901 (West Supp. 1997); W. VA. CODE
§ 31B-1-101 (1996); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 183.0102 (West Supp. 1997); WYo. STAT. ANN. § 17-15-101
(Michie 1997).
Recognizing the increasing popularity of using alternative corporate forms, the National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws adopted the Uniform Limited Liability
Company Act ("ULLCA") in August 1994. As with other uniform acts, the ULLCA will serve to
focus debate on and legislative reform of the proper LLC form.
12. "Naturally, the primary function of a limited liability company is to provide limited
liability to its members." Eric Fox, Note, Piercing the Veil of Limited Liability Companies, 62
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1143, 1147-48 (1994). In addition, "[tlhe managers of an LLC... enjoy
limits on personal liability." Id
13. The current tax treatment of the LLC is yet another feature attractive to businesses
and is largely responsible for the growing acceptance of LLCs. Corporations are subject to
double taxation, while partnerships enjoy a more beneficial "single tax" scheme. Victor E.
Fleischer, Note, 'If It Looks Like a Duck"." Corporate Resemblance and Check-the-Box Elective
Tax Classification, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 518, 522-23 (1996) (comparing the "double tax on
corporate earnings" with the tax treatment of "flow-through entities" like partnerships). Until
recently, the question of whether LLCs would be taxed as partnerships or corporations was
unanswered. The IRS first considered the question in 1988, when it ruled that a Wyoming LLC
would be classified as a partnership for tax purposes. See Rev. Rul. 88-76, 1988-2 C.B. 360
(1988). The IRS then promulgated regulations to determine whether an unincorporated entity
would be taxed as a corporation. See, e.g., Former Treas. Reg. 301.7701-2. These regulations
listed six criteria to consider when determining the tax classification: "(1) associates, (2) an
objective to carry on business and divide the gains therefrom, (3) continuity of life, (4)
centralization of management, (5) liability for corporate debts limited to corporate property, and
(6) free transferability of interests." Id. An entity would be taxed as a corporation "if the
corporate characteristics [were] such that the organization more nearly resemble[d] a
corporation than a partnership or trust." Id. (citing Morrissey v. Commissioner, 296 U.S. 344
(1935)). Because the first two criteria are elements common to both corporations and
partnerships, the tax treatment of a particular entity depended on whether it met the
remaining four criteria. Specifically, an entity was classified as a partnership if it lacked at
least two of the four remaining criteria. See id. Because LLCs lack continuity of life and free
transferability of interests, they were taxed as partnerships under the former IRS regulations.
The IRS recently determined that those rules had become increasingly formalistic. As a
result, the IRS issued new regulations which replace the existing classification ones with a
simplified elective procedure. See Treas. Reg. 301.7701-1 to -3 (1996). The regulations, also
called "check-the-box" rules, were effective as of January 1, 1997, providing a special transition
rule for existing entities. See Treas. Reg. 301.7701(f)(1). The regulations specify those business
entities that are automatically classified as corporations and provide that any other business
entity, including an LLC, may elect its classification for federal tax purposes. See Treas. Reg.
7701-2(b), -3(a).
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a hybrid of the corporate and partnership forms, combining the bene-
fits of each. 14
The governance characteristics of the LLC, though still evolv-
ing, offer more flexibility than that of other organizational forms. 15
LLCs are owned by "members," rather than shareholders or partners.
Most LLC statutory default rules assign all management function to
the members, 16 who, as a result, have powers similar to those of
partners in a general partnership. 17 Members may, however, desire
more separation of function. To address this desire, LLC statutes
usually provide a set of fall-back rules, which take away most of the
management powers and authority that members would otherwise
Needless to say, under the check-the-box rules, most LLCs choose to be taxed as partner-
ships to avoid double taxation. For a general discussion of the check-the-box regulations, see
Fleischer, supra, at 518.
14. To wit, it combines corporate limited liability with partnership tax benefits. See gener-
ally ULLCA prefatory note (1995) ("The allure of the limited liability company is its unique
ability to bring together in a single business organization the best features of all other business
forms-properly structured, its owners obtain both a corporate-styled liability shield and the
pass-through tax benefits of a partnership.").
15. All LLC statutes allow members to choose between centralized and direct
management. For a detailed discussion of governance rules in member-managed and manager-
managed LLCs, see LARRY E. RIBSTEIN & ROBERT R. KEATINGE, 1 RIBsTEIN & KEATINGE ON
IMaTED LIABILrrY COMPANiES §§ 8.02 to 8.04 (1994).
16. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 10-12-22(a) (1994); ALASKA STAT. § 10.50.110(a) (Michie 1996);
ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 29-681(a) (West Supp. 1996); ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-32-401(a) (Michie
1996); CAL. CORP. CODE § 17150 (West Supp. 1997); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 7-80-401 (West
Supp. 1997); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 34-130 (West Supp. 1997); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6,
§ 18-402 (Supp. 1996); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 608.422 (West Supp. 1997); GA. CODE ANN. § 14-11-304
(1994); IDAHO CODE § 53-621(1) (1994); 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 180/15-1 (West 1997); IND.
CODE ANN. § 23-18-4-1(a) (Michie 1995); IOWA CODE ANN. § 490A.702(1) (West Supp. 1997); KAN.
STAT. ANN. § 17-7612 (1995); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 275.030 (Michie Supp. 1996); LA. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 12:1311 (West 1994); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 31, § 651(1) (West 1996); MD. CODE ANN.,
CORPS. & Ass'Ns § 4A402 (Supp. 1997); MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 450.4401 (West Supp. 1997);
Mo. ANN. STAT. § 347.079(1) (West Supp. 1997); MONT. CODE ANN. § 35-8-401(1) (1995); NEB.
REv. STAT. ANN. § 21-2615 (Supp. 1996); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 86.291 (Michie Supp. 1995);
N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 304-C:31(11) (1995); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 42:2B-27 (West Supp. 1997); N.M.
STAT. ANN. § 53-19-15(A) (Michie Supp. 1993); N.Y. LTD. LIAB. Co. LAW § 401 (McKinney Supp.
1997); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 57C-3-20(a) (Supp. 1993); OR. REv. STAT. § 63.130 (Supp. 1996); R.I.
GEN. LAWS § 7-16-14 (1992); S.D. CODIFIED LAws ANN. § 47-34-16 (Michie Supp. 1997); UTAH
CODE ANN. § 48-2b-125(1) (1994); VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-1022A (Michie Supp. 1997); WASH. REV.
CODE ANN. § 25.15.150 (West Supp. 1997); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 183.0401(1) (West Supp. 1997);
WYo. STAT. ANN. § 17-15-116 (Michie 1997). But see MINN. STAT. ANN. § 322B.606 (West 1995)
(requiring use of managers); N.D. CENT. CODE § 10-32-69 (1995) (same); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit.
18, § 2015 (West Supp. 1997) (providing for the use of managers unless otherwise provided);
TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-238-101 (Supp. 1994) (containing no default for member or management
control); TEx. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 1528n, art. 2.12 (West 1997) (providing for the use of
managers unless otherwise provided).
17. In fact, LLC statutes are largely patterned after the Uniform Partnership Act ("UPA");
consequently, many scholars predict that courts will draw heavily on partnership law prece-
dents governing similar provisions and situations for LLC's. See generally O'KELLEY &
THOMPSON, supra note 8, at 70-71.
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possess and assign them to "managers."18 These rules allow the
managers to function like officers in a corporation. At the formation
of the LLC, the members may invoke this fall-back rule by
designating in the articles of organization that the LLC shall be
managed by managers, not members.19 In effect, then, current LLC
statutes authorize two governance forms: the "member-managed"
LLC, which is analogous to a partnership, and the "manager-
managed" LLC, which is analogous to a corporation.20 Indeed, which
form is chosen is likely the most important factor in deciding whether
an LLC's members are employees or partners for purposes of the
ADEA.21
B. Defining "Employee" Under the ADEA
The ADEA prohibits age discrimination in employment rela-
tionships. 22 While courts have construed the ADEA broadly in light of
18. For statutory provisions for LI management by managers, see, for example, ALA.
CODE § 10-12-22(b) (1994); ALASKA STAT. § 10.50.110(b) (Michie 1996); ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 29-681(b) (West Supp. 1996); AR. CODE ANN. § 4-32-401 (Michie 1996); CAL. CORP. CODE
§ 17151 (West Supp. 1997); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 7-80-401 (West Supp. 1997); CONN. GEN.
STAT. ANN. § 34-140(b) (West Supp. 1997); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-402 (1993); FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 608.422 (West Supp. 1997); GA. CODE ANN. § 14-11-304 (1994); IDAHO CODE § 53-621(2)
(1994); 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 180/15-1 (West Supp. 1997); IND. CODE ANN. § 23-18-4-1(b)
(Michie 1995); IOWA CODE ANN. § 490A.705 (West Supp. 1997); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-7612
(1995); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 275.165 (Michie Supp. 1996); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:1312 (West
1994); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 31, § 651(3) (West 1996); MD. CODE ANN., CORPS. & ASSNS
§ 4A-402(aX1) (Supp. 1997); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 450.4402 (West Supp. 1997); Mo. ANN.
STAT. § 347.079(2) (West Supp. 1997); MONT. CODE ANN. § 35-8-402(2) (1995); NEB. REv. STAT.
§ 21-2615 (Supp. 1996); NEv. REv. STAT. ANN. § 86.291 (Michie Supp. 1995); N.H. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 304-C:31(I) (1995); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 42:2B-27 (West Supp. 1997); N.M. STAT. ANN.
§ 53-19-15(B) (Michie Supp. 1996); N.Y. LTD. LIAB. Co. LAW § 408(a) (McKinney Supp. 1997);
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 57C-3-24 (Supp. 1993); O& REv. STAT. § 63.135 (Supp. 1996); R.I. GEN. LAWS§ 7-16-15 (1992); S.D. CODIFIED LAwS § 47-34-16 (Michie Supp. 1997); UTAH CODE ANN.§ 48-2b-125 (Supp. 1997); VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-1024 (Michie Supp. 1997); WASH. REV. CODE§ 25.15.150 (West Supp. 1997); W. VA. CODE § 31B-4-405 (1996); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 183.0401(2)
(West Supp. 1997); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 17-15-116 (Michie 1997).
19. See supra note 15 (dicussing the statutory choice of management forms for LLCs).
20. Most members will probably choose to manage the LLC directly. Because LLC
interests are not freely transferable, the members will likely feel a greater need to participate in
management to ensure profitability. In addition, if the LLC chooses to use centralized
management, the number of corporate attributes increases, which would have made its
partnership tax treatment less certain under the old entity-classification rules. Of course, the
check-the-box rules have supplanted the old regulations, see supra note 13, but most existing
LLCs organized and chose their governance form under the supplanted treasury regulations.
21. See infra Part IV.B (discussing the effects of choosing the different governance options
for LLCs).
22. There are certain statutory exemptions, however, where age is a relevant employment
factor. For instance, where age is a bona fide occupational qualification reasonably necessary to
the normal operation of a particular business, the employer may justify a facially discriminatory
action. See 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(1) (1994).
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its remedial nature,2 the statute expressly applies only to discrimina-
tion by an employer against an employee or an applicant for employ-
ment.2 Thus, defining "employee" for purposes of the ADEA deter-
mines whom the Act protects. 5 The statute itself offers courts no
guidance; it defines "employee" in circular fashion, as "an individual
employed by an employer."26 Congress's failure to provide a workable
definition has spawned much litigation.27 As one might expect, courts
have employed different tests and have reached different outcomes on
almost identical facts. For example, when distinguishing between
independent contractors and employees, courts developed three tests,
resulting in seemingly incongruent decisions.28
Courts also disagree about the Act's applicability to principals
of certain business entities. Specifically, courts disagree as to
whether partners in a partnership, shareholders in a professional
corporation, and directors in a corporation are "employees" and
thereby receive ADEA protection.2 9 Although courts have consistently
23. See, e.g., Lilley v. BTM Corp., 958 F.2d 746, 750 (6th Cir. 1992) ("The term 'employee'
is to be given broad construction in order to effectuate the remedial purpose of the ADEA.").
The Supreme Court, however, recently cast doubt on the validity of this interpretative canon in
Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318 (1992). There, the Court expressly abandoned
its earlier emphasis on construing the term employee "in light of the mischief to be corrected
and the end to be attained." Id. at 325 (quoting United States v. Silk, 331 U.S. 704, 713 (1947)).
24. See 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1). This form of discrimination is the only one expressly
recognized under the ADEA.
25. Defining "employee" is also important in determining who may be liable under the
ADEA. The Act specifies that only employers employing at least 20 workers are covered by the
ADEA. See id. § 630(b) (defining employer as "a person engaged in an industry affecting
commerce who has twenty or more employees for each working day of twenty or more calendar
weeks in the current or preceding year"). Thus, whether LLC members are treated as employ-
ees will affect the ability of an LLC's nonmembers to claim an ADEA violation.
26. Id. § 630(f).
27. In most of these cases, the company's policy or action, such as a mandatory retirement
policy, would clearly violate the Act if the plaintiff were deemed an employee. Therefore, the
company argues only that persons affected by the concededly discriminatory policy are not
employees.
28. See, e.g., Hayden v. La-Z-Boy Chair Co., 9 F.3d 617, 622 (7th Cir. 1993) (applying an
"economic reality" test); Frankel v. Bally, Inc., 987 F.2d 86, 90 (2d Cir. 1993) (applying a
"common law agency" test); Oestman v. National Farmers Union Ins. Co., 958 F.2d 303, 305
(10th Cir. 1992) (applying a "hybrid" test). In 1992, however, the Supreme Court settled the
issue, choosing the common law agency test as the appropriate test for distinguishing between
independent contractors and employees for purposes of federal employment discrimination
statutes. See Darden, 503 U.S. at 323.
29. See infra Part I (discussing courts' applications of the statutes to different organiza-
tional forms). See generally Troy D. Ferguson, Comment, Partners as Employees under the
Federal Employment Discrimination Statutes: Are the Roles of Partner and Employee Mutually
Exclusive?, 42 U. MIAMI L. REV. 699 (1988) (analyzing federal antidiscrimination statutes and
the status of partners as employees); Rebecca R. Luchok, Comment, Coming of Age in the
Professional Corporation: Liability of Professional Corporations for Dismissal of Members
Under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 48 U. Prrr. L. REV. 1185 (1987) (analyzing
the applicability of the ADEA to professional corporations); John Narducci, Note, The
436
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recognized the existence of a partnership exemption,30 finding that
bona fide partners are not employees and thus lack standing to sue
under the ADEA, courts have had a more difficult time applying the
partnership exemption outside the pure partnership form. Courts
have struggled to determine whether the exemption properly applies
to shareholders of a professional corporation s' or to directors of a
corporation.32
The creation and increased use of hybrid corporate forms like
the LLC exacerbates the uncertainty in the intended coverage of the
ADEA. Just as the ADEA does not address whether partners, share-
holders, or directors are employees, it also does not state whether
members of an LLC are employees. The LLC stands in the middle
between the partnership and the corporation, combining the beneficial
elements of each.3 3 Therefore, members of an LLC are in some ways
similar to both partners and corporate employees.Y Courts will soon
Application of Antidiscrimination Statutes to Shareholders of Professional Corporations:
Forcing Fellow Shareholders Out of the Club, 55 FORDHAM L. REV. 839 (1987) (discussing the
ability of partners to sue under federal discrimination statutes); Leigh Pokora, Comment,
Partners as Employees Under Title VII: The Saga Continues-A Comment on the State of the
Law, 22 OHio N.U. L. REV. 249 (1995) (discussing the different theories used by courts to
determine if partners are employees).
30. See infra Part llI.A (discussing partners and the partnership exemption). This Note
often refers to a "partnership exemption" and its application to be consistent with the language
of existing case law. The term "exemption" is somewhat misleading, however. It implies
coverage exists, from which a dispensation is provided. Instead, the question in most cases is
whether the basic commands of the statute apply in the first place. When courts say they
recognize a "partnership exemption" to employment discrimination statutes, they simply mean
that the statutes do not apply to partners. In other words, they are construing the statutory
term "employee" so as not to include partners. Similarly, when courts say that they are extend-
ing the partnership exemption to other principals, such as professional corporation shareholders
or corporate directors, they simply mean that the same logic preventing partners from being
"employees" applies to these principals. Likewise, when this Note asserts that LLC members
should be deemed de facto partners or that the partnership exemption should apply to LLCs, it
simply argues that the same logic preventing partners from being considered "employees"
applies with equal force to LLC members.
31. See infra Part llI.B (analyzing courts' treatment of claims that shareholders in profes-
sional corporations are employees).
32. See infra Part Il.C (analyzing courts' treatment of claims that directors of
corporations are employees). For example, while the Eighth Circuit did not hesitate to apply
the partnership exemption to a professional corporation, see Devine v. Stone, Leyton &
Gershman, P.C., 100 F.3d 78, 82 (8th Cir. 1996) (using a balancing test to find that relevant
factors for the application of the exemption existed), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 1694 (1997), the
Second Circuit held that the partnership exemption to the ADEA is limited to actual
partnerships. See EEOC v. Johnson & Higgins, Inc., 91 F.3d 1529, 1537 (2d Cir. 1996) (limiting
exemption to actual de jure partnerships), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 47 (1997).
33. LLCs combine partnership tax rules with corporate limited liability. See supra Part
II.A. (discussing the LLCs hybrid form).
34. As one author noted, "[ilt is not clear whether LLC members will be treated more as
employees or partners under the employment discrimination laws." Larry E. Ribstein, The
Emergence of the Limited Liability Company, 51 Bus. LAW. 1, 44 (1995). "[Aln LLC member
does not seem clearly like either a partner or an employee." Id. at 45.
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be forced to decide whether to extend the ADEA's partnership exemp-
tion to graying members of LLCs.
Because no precedential case law exists defining the status of
LLC members under the ADEA, the only guidance available to courts
considering the question comes from cases dealing with other entities
such as partnerships and professional corporations3 5
III. DECISIONS IN = GRAY AREA
To establish standing in an employment discrimination case
under the ADEA, a plaintiff must prove he is an "employee."36 Courts
have uniformly recognized the existence of a partnership exemption,
pursuant to which certain "partners" are not employees for purposes
of federal employment discrimination statutes.3 7 In deciding when, if
at all, to apply the exemption to corporations resembling partnerships
or to partnerships resembling corporations, however, courts are
deeply divided. Typically, courts focus on either the form of organiza-
tion or the economic reality of the relationship between the plaintiff
and the organization. Which of these competing considerations a
court emphasizes determines whether it will regard the plaintiff as an
employee for purposes of the ADEA.
A. Partners and the Partnership Exemption
While the ADEA does not address whether partners in a gen-
eral partnership are subject to protection, courts have generally
agreed that bona fide partners are not employees for purposes of the
ADEA.38 Consequently, in litigation involving partners under the
ADEA or other federal employment discrimination statutes,39 the
35. For a discussion of these cases, see infra Part Ill.
36. See supra note 24 (noting that ADEA prohibits age discrimination in employment rela-
tionships).
37. See supra note 25 (discussing the reason to debate who is an employer); see also infra
Part HI.A (discussing the partnership exemption as applied to partners).
38. This partnership exemption is probably grounded in the aggregate theory of partner-
ship, which maintains that a partnership does not exist apart from its partners. Under this
theory, the partnership is not an employer; instead, the partners are deemed the employers.
Consequently, the partner is denied employee status because he cannot be an employee of
himself. For an examination of the conflict between the aggregate and entity theories of
partnership, see generally Ladry Jensen, Is a Partnership Under the Uniform Partnership Act
an Aggregate or an Entity?, 16 VAND. L. REv. 377 (1963) (concluding that both theories are
unsatisfactory).
39. Such an analysis is used in other federal employment discrimination statutes. The
substantive prohibitions of the ADEA were derived verbatim from Title VII. See Lorillard v.
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question is often whether an individual is a nominal partner or one
that possesses all of the indicia of partnership status.
One of the earliest cases in which a court wrestled with the
question of whether partners can qualify as employees under federal
employment discrimination laws is Burke v. Friedman.4° In that case,
the Seventh Circuit established a per se rule that partners are not
employees, explaining that it failed to understand how partners who
own and manage a business can be considered employees rather than
employers. 41
Similarly, the Eleventh Circuit recognized the partnership
exemption in Hishon v. King & Spalding.42 In that case, Hishon initi-
ated a Title VII suit against King & Spalding, a law firm, contending
that the firm had refused to invite her into its partnership on the
basis of her gender.43  To establish the necessary employment
relationship under Title VII, Hishon asserted that the firm treated its
partners in a way that was similar to the way a corporation treats its
employees.44 The district court, however, held Title VII inapplicable
to partnership decisions and dismissed the case.45 On appeal, Hishon
exhorted the court to use an economic reality test to determine
whether the partners were employees.46 The Eleventh Circuit, how-
ever, affirmed the lower court's dismissal, finding "a clear distinction
between employees of a corporation and partners of a law firm."47
Finding the partner/employee distinction irrelevant, the
Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the Eleventh Circuit on the
grounds that Hishon was not yet a partner, but was instead an asso-
ciate being considered for partnership." The Court reasoned that in
some circumstances, "partnership consideration may qualify as a
term, condition, or privilege of a person's employment with an em-
ployer large enough to be covered by Title VII."49 The Court thereby
avoided Hishon's argument that the partners of the defendant law
Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 584 (1978) ("[Tlhe prohibitions of the ADEA were derived in haec verba from
Title VII."). Moreover, the definition of "employee" is the same in both statutes: an individual
employed by an employer. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(f) (1994). Consequently, decisions under Title
VII are persuasive authority for cases under the ADEA.
40. 556 F.2d 867 (7th Cir. 1977).
41. See id. at 869.
42. 678 F.2d 1022 (11th Cir. 1982), rev'd on other grounds, 467 U.S. 69 (1984).
43. See id. at 1024-25.
44. See id. at 1026.
45. See id. at 1024.
46. See id. at 1027 n.9. For an example of the economic reality test, see infra text
accompanying note 77.
47. Id. at 1028.
48. See Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69,77 (1984).
49. Id. at 77-78 n.10.
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firm were employees rather than owners.50 Thus, the Supreme Court
left open the question of whether partners may qualify as employees
under federal employment discrimination laws.
Although the majority opinion did not directly address whether
partners are exempt from Title VII coverage, Justice Powell, in a
concurring opinion, clarified that Hishon did not extend Title VII to
the management of a law firm by its partners. Powell emphasized
that the Court's reasoning did not characterize the relationship
among partners as an "employment7 relationship for purposes of Title
VII.51 By emphasizing that "the relationship among law partners
differs markedly from that between employer and employee [for] [t]he
essence of the law partnership is the common conduct of a shared
enterprise,"52 Justice Powell validated the partnership exemption for
federal employment discrimination laws.53
Powell's concurrence seems to support a per se rule that the
roles of partner and employee are mutually exclusive. Although the
majority in Hishon did not expressly share Justice Powell's views,
courts in subsequent cases have used Justice Powell's dicta from
Hishon to justify decisions to deny partners the right to invoke federal
employment discrimination statutes like the ADEA.M
50. See id. at 74 n.4.
51. See id. at 79 (Powell, J., concurring).
52. Id. at 79-80 (Powell, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
53. See supra note 39 (discussing Title VIrs relation to the ADEA).
54. See infra text accompanying notes 55-70 (discussing the subsequent cases). In
Holland v. Ernst & Whinney, 35 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 34,653 (N.D. Ala. Aug. 17, 1984),
another case in which a court invoked the partnership exemption to the ADEA, the plaintiff
attempted to bring an ADEA action against a partnership in which he had been a partner for 11
years before his dismissal for allegedly discriminatory reasons. See id. The court dismissed the
plaintiffs action. See id. The court opined that the plaintiffs role as partner in the defendant
partnership did not constitute employment and since the "ADEA applies only to discrimination
in the context of employment, [the Act] has no application in the context of this case." Id.
Similarly, in Maher v. Price Waterhouse, No. 84-1522C(2), 1985 WL 9500, at *1 (E.D. Mo. Apr. 8,
1985), a district court applied the partnership exemption. In that case, the plaintiff brought an
ADEA action against the accounting firm at which he was formerly a partner. See id. The court
granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment. See id. Relying principally on Burke
and Justice Powell's concurring opinion in Hishon, the court held that partners are not
employees under the ADEA. See id. That same court recently applied the partnership
exemption again in Rhoads v. Jones Financial Co., 957 F. Supp. 1102 (E.D. Mo. 1997). There,
the plaintiff brought Title VII and ADEA claims against the limited partnership where she had
been a general partner for 10 years before her termination. See id. at 1103. The plaintiff
argued that she could not be considered a general partner because she was not personally
involved in business decisions of the partnership and other general partners controlled her
work. See id. at 1109. The court rejected this argument and dismissed her claims, holding that
"[plossessing a few indicia of employee status [does] not destroy plaintiffs status as a partner[,]J "
id. at 1110, and, of course, "[p]artners in a partnership are not employees and thus cannot avail
themselves of the benefits of the antidiscrimination statutes." Id. at 1106.
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In Wheeler v. Main Hurdman, for example, the Court of
Appeals for the Tenth Circuit cited Hishon as support for its holding
that a partner in an accounting firm was not an employee with
standing to bring suit under the ADEA.s5 In that case, Marilyn
Wheeler was fired seventeen months after her promotion to partner at
Main Hurdman, the defendant accounting firm. 56 Wheeler brought an
action under the ADEA and Title VII.57 Main Hurdman contended
that Wheeler, as a partner in the firm, was not an employee, and
accordingly, it moved to dismiss her complaint.58 Wheeler conceded
that she was a partner under state partnership law; however, she
argued that her status at the firm was, in economic reality, that of an
employee5 9 For instance, after she attained partner status, her work
changed very little.60 Furthermore, Wheeler argued that Main'
Hurdman's organizational structure was similar to that of a
corporation.61
Notwithstanding Wheeler's argument, the Tenth Circuit de-
nied her request for application of an economic reality test.62 The
court stated that any such test would "ignore or unacceptably dimin-
ish the essential attributes of partnership, [and would be] incapable of
rational application."63 Instead, the court espoused a per se rule that
bona fide general partners are not employees under the federal
employment discrimination acts." Conceding that many aspects of a
partner's work environment may be indistinguishable from that of a
corporate employee, the court nevertheless concluded that the sum of
partnership characteristics was sufficient to prevent general partners
from being considered employees under the statute.65
55. 825 F.2d 257,258,263-64 (10th Cir. 1987) (citing Hishon, 467 U.S. at 78 n.10).
56. See id at 261-62.
57. See icd at 258.
58. See ii
59. See id. at 261.
60. She maintained the same client load, the same duties and responsibilities, and the
same support staff. See id. In addition, the same department head supervised her work. See
kL The firm continued to maintain a personnel file on her, and the managing partner
established the amount charged for her services. See id.
61. This structure included a managing partner and a policy board with primary responsi-
bility for the management and control of the partnership. Main Hurdman had 80 offices na-
tionwide and over 500 "partners." In other words, Main Hurdman looked and acted like a
corporation. See id.
62. See id, at 276.
63. Id.
64. See id. at 277.
65. See id. The court emphasized that a partner's "participation in profits and losses,
exposure to liability, investment in the firm, partial ownership of firm assets, and... voting
rights... clearly place[s] her in a different economic and legal category [than an employee]."
Id- at 276.
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In Serapion v. Martinez, the Court of Appeals for the First
Circuit similarly held that bona fide partners are not employees
under federal antidiscrimination laws.66 In that case, when
Serapion's three former partners dissolved her former law firm and
simultaneously forged a new partnership, she sued them and their
new firm for sex discrimination in violation of Title VII.67 The
defendants responded by asserting the applicability of the partnership
exemption.68 Serapion argued that she was not a bona fide partner,
notwithstanding that she "had an ownership interest in the Firm;
that her compensation depended substantially on the Firm's fortunes;
and that she enjoyed significant voting rights."69 The court held,
however, that no reasonable factfinder could conclude that she was
not a bona fide equity partner; therefore, Serapion could not claim
Title VII protection."
On the other hand, the United States District Court for the
Southern District of New York held in Caruso v. Peat, Marwick,
Mitchell & Co. that a partner in an accounting and consulting firm
was an employee for purposes of the ADEA.71 In that case, Caruso
brought an age discrimination suit under the ADEA against Peat
Marwick, which in turn argued that Caruso's status as a partner pre-
cluded him from being considered an employee.72 The court acknowl-
edged that a central corporate figure or controlling owner is not an
employee under the ADEA definition;3 however, it stressed that an
employee with an impressive title, such as partner, does not necessar-
ily lack ADEA protection.74
The court noted that some courts follow a per se rule that
anyone denoted as a partner is not within the ADEA definition of
employee.75 The Caruso court declined to follow that rule,76 however,
66. See 119 F.3d 982, 986 (1st Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 690 (1997).
67. See id.
68. See id.
69. Id. at 992.
70. See id.
71. See 664 F. Supp. 144, 150 (S.D.N.Y. 1987).
72. See id.
73. See id.
74. See id.
75. See id. at 147. One example of a court following a per se rule is the Tenth Circuit in
Wheeler v. Main Hurdman, 825 F.2d 257 (10th Cir. 1987). See supra notes 55-65 and
accompanying text (discussing Wheeler).
76. The court noted that a per se rule that the ADEA cannot apply to individuals
employed under the title of partner is inconsistent with EEOC v. Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co.,
775 F.2d 928 (8th Cir. 1985). In that case, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals held that an
EEOC investigation to determine whether individuals classified as partners fall within the
definition of "employee" for purposes of the ADEA was legitimate and could proceed.
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opting instead for a three-part "economic reality" test. The test fo-
cused on three factors that, in reality, indicate whether an individual
is a partner or an employee in an enterprise: the extent of the
individual's ability to control and operate the business, the extent to
which the individual's compensation is calculated as a percentage of
business profits, and the extent of the individual's employment
security."7 The court found these three factors to be more important
than the fact that Peat Marwick had organized as a partnership with
Caruso as one of its partners.78 As a result, the court held that
Caruso was an employee for purposes of the ADEA.
In Simpson v. Ernst & Young, the Court of Appeals for the
Sixth Circuit held that a former partner in an accounting and
consulting firm was an employee for purposes of the ADEA.79 There,
after Ernst & Young asked Simpson to resign, Simpson brought suit
under the ADEA, claiming that the firm had discriminated against
him because of age.80 The firm responded that Simpson was a
partner, not an employee, and therefore was beyond the reach of the
ADEA.81 Nonetheless, because he held none of the rights usually
associated with true partnership, the court decided that he was an
employee, regardless of any title he held.82
The Sixth Circuit affirmed the lower court's decision that the
plaintiff "had few, if any, meaningful attributes of a partner [and]
[flor all practical purposes, he was an employee."83 The appellate
court acknowledged the existence of a partnership exemption, stating
"it is significant to observe that bona fide independent contractors and
Interestingly, the Caruso court also cited Justice Powell's Hishon concurrence as support for
rejecting the per se rule exempting partners from coverage by the ADEA. See Caruso, 664 F.
Supp. at 147-48. Of course, Justice Powell's opinion in Hishon is most frequently cited as
establishing the existence of a partnership exemption to ADEA coverage. See, e.g., Wheeler, 825
F.2d at 257 (noting that the significance of the Powell opinion might be limited). In an
important footnote, however, Justice Powell cautioned that "an employer may not evade the
strictures of Title VII simply by labeling its employees as 'partners.'" Hishon v. King &
Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 79 n.2 (1984) (Powell, J., concurring). The court in Caruso argued that
this footnote underscored the inherent weakness of the per se rule exempting partners from the
protection of the ADEA. See Caruso, 664 F. Supp. at 147-48. "Such a rule," the court concluded,
"would allow employers to strip employees of their ADEA rights simply by denoting all
employees as partners.'" Id. at 148.
77. See Caruso, 664 F. Supp. at 149-50.
78. "Caruso largely lacked any control,]... [his] salary [varied] little with the firm's
profits, [and] Peat Marwick in no way considered him a permanent member of the firm." Id. at
150.
79. See 100 F.3d 436, 439 (6th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 1862 (1997).
80. See id.
81. See id.
82. See id.
83. Id. at 442.
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partners are employers, not employees; and as employers, neither
come within the entitlement protection or coverage of [the ADEA]." 4
The court, however, ignored Simpson's "partner" label and instead
emphasized the economic reality of Simpson's relationship with Ernst
& Young.m In particular, the court focused on Simpson's lack of
control and authority.86 Eschewing a per se rule in favor of an
"economic reality" test, the court, therefore, concluded that Simpson
was not a bona fide partner, but was instead an employee of the
fi .87
These cases illustrate that while all courts recognize the part-
nership exemption, courts remain divided as to whether to examine
the bona fides of the plaintiffs classification as "partner." Regardless,
true partners are not employees and thus have no standing under the
ADEA.
B. Shareholders in a Professional Corporation
Courts uniformly acknowledge the partnership exemption;
however, they disagree not only as to whether to review a classifica-
tion of "partner," but also as to whether to deny ADEA coverage to
people other than partners. For example, as with the debate over
whether a person labeled a partner is, in fact, an employee,8 circuits
are split as to whether shareholders of professional corporations
should ever be treated as de facto partners for purposes of standing
under federal employment discrimination statutes. 9
1. Courts That Emphasize Economic Reality
In most cases, courts have used employment discrimination
statutes to deny standing to professional corporation shareholders
84. Id. at 443 (emphasis added). The court also noted that this issue was one of first im-
pression not yet addressed by the Supreme Court. See id.
85. See id.
86. Simpson was under virtually absolute control by Ernst & Young's management
committee. He had no authority with respect to the admission or discharge of other partners,
could not vote for members of the management committee, could not participate in the firm's
profits, and could not freely examine the books and records of the firm. See id. at 443 n.2.
87. See id. at 444.
88. See supra part HIA (discussing the contrasting classification tests for partners).
89. Compare EEOC v. Dowd & Dowd, Ltd., 736 F.2d 1177 (7th Cir. 1984) (applying
partnership exemption to shareholders in a professional corporation) with Hyland v. New Haven
Radiology Assocs., P.C., 794 F.2d 793 (2d Cir. 1986) (refusing to apply partnership exemption to
shareholders in a professional corporation).
For a general discussion of the history and structure of professional corporations, see
Luchok, supra note 29, at 1194-95, and Narducci, supra note 29, at 851-56.
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who function as de facto partners. For instance, the Seventh, Eighth,
and Eleventh Circuits have each held that professional corporations
so closely resemble partnerships that their shareholders should be
treated as partners for purposes of federal employment discrimination
statutes. 90 As with some courts' approaches in the partnership con-
text,91 these courts have been willing to look beyond the form of or-
ganization and focus instead on the economic reality of the profes-
sional corporation.
In EEOC v. Dowd & Dowd, Ltd., the Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit addressed the question of whether a professional
corporation's shareholders are employees of that corporation for
purposes of Title VII.92 The court concluded that they are not employ-
ees and, thus, have no standing under Title VII.9 Specifically, the
court focused on the economic reality of the professional corporation,
concluding that "[t]he role of a shareholder in a professional corpora-
tion is far more analogous to a partner in a partnership than it is to
the shareholder of a general corporation."94 Accordingly, the court
invoked the partnership exemption it had recognized earlier in
Burke.95
Similarly, in Fountain v. Metcalf, Zima & Co., PA., the Court
of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit followed the reasoning set forth in
Dowd, holding that a shareholder of a professional corporation func-
tioned as a partner, not an employee, and thus lacked standing to sue
for violation of the ADEA.9 In reaching its conclusion, the court fo-
cused on the shareholder's actual role in corporate operations and the
relationship between that role and traditional management, control,
and ownership concepts. 97 Applying this economic reality test,98 the
court reasoned that the management, control, and ownership of a
professional corporation parallels that of a partnership.9 Therefore,
the court held that professional corporation shareholders should be
treated as partners under the ADEA and have no standing to sue. 0
90. See infra notes 92-103 and accompanying text (discussing the courts' holdings).
91. See supra Part IA (discussing application of exemption in partnership context).
92. 736 F.2d 1177 (7th Cir. 1984).
93. See id. at 1177.
94. Id. at 1178.
95. See id-
96. See 925 F.2d 1398, 1401 (11th Cir. 1991).
97. See id. at 1400-01.
98. This test is similar to the "economic reality" test set forth by the court in Caruso. See
supra text accompanying note 77.
99. See id& at 1401.
100. See id.
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The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit likewise extended
the partnership exemption to shareholders of a professional corpora-
tion. That court, in Devine v. Stone, Leyton & Gershman, P.C., looked
past the organizational form and focused on the substance of the
employment relationship1 Applying an economic reality test to the
facts of Devine, the court found that the shareholders participated in
all management decisions and set firm policy.0 2 Citing Fountain and
Dowd, the court concluded that the professional corporation
shareholders acted as partners and thus should not be classified as
employees.103
2. Courts That Emphasize the Organizational Form
Some courts, however, consider the form of organization to be
decisive, and, consequently, find that all individuals working for a
professional corporation are per se employees. The Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit has adopted this per se approach. In Hyland v.
New Haven Radiology Associates, P.C., the court refused to look
beyond the form of organization to discern the true nature of the
employment relationship.104 In that case, Hyland alleged that he was
forced to resign as an employee, officer and director of defendant New
Haven Radiology Associates ("NHRA") because of his age. In response
to Hyland's ADEA claim, NHRA asserted that Hyland should be
considered a partner because the company was a professional
corporation, which is more like a partnership than a corporation.0 5
The district court, at NIRA's urging, had applied an economic reality
test and found that NHRA amounted to a partnership in everything
but the name.06
The Second Circuit, however, rejected the economic reality test
in favor of a per se rule focusing exclusively on the corporate form.
According to the court, "[t]he fact that certain modern partnerships
and corporations are practically indistinguishable in structure and
operation.., is no reason for ignoring a form of business organization
101. 100 F.3d 78, 80,82(8th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 1694(1997).
102. See id. at 82.
103. See id. at 80.
104. See 794 F.2d 793, 798 (2d Cir. 1986).
105. See id. at 795. When Hyland and four other radiologists organized NHRA as a profes-
sional corporation, each contributed the same capital and received equal shares in the corpora-
tion and an equal voice in management. Profits and losses were divided evenly among the
members, all of whom served as corporate officers and directors. Every shareholder, including
Hyland, signed a separate employment agreement with the corporation. See id. at 794-95.
106. See id. at 794.
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freely chosen and established."10 7 Therefore, the court limited the
partnership exemption to actual de jure partnerships and held
accordingly that shareholders of professional corporations are always
employees under the ADEA.O8
C. Directors in a Corporation
The circuits have also disagreed as to whether directors of
corporations are employees for purposes of employment discrimina-
tion'statutes. 109 The Seventh and Eighth Circuits, as well as two dis-
trict courts, have concluded that directors, even those who also serve
as officer-employees, are not employees for purposes of federal em-
ployment discrimination legislation.110 Rather than focus on the
"employee" title assigned by the corporation, these courts look at the
economic reality of acting as a director in a corporation.
For instance, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit has
twice ruled that directors are not employees for purposes of Title VII
or ADEA coverage. In Zimmerman v. North American Signal Co., the
court held that the term "employee" does not include persons who are
only directors of the corporation.", In so holding, the court relied on
its earlier decision in Burke, where it had ruled that partners are not
107. Id. at 798 (emphasis added).
108. See id. For another case in which a court, following Hyland, refused to extend the
partnership exemption to a professional corporation, see Rosenblatt v. Bivona & Cohen, 969 F.
Supp. 207 (S.D.N.Y. 1997). In that case, Rosenblatt sued the law firm, a professional corpora-
tion, where he was a nonequity "partner." See id. at 209. He claimed the firm terminated him
because of his interracial marriage. See id. The law firm asserted that Rosenblatt did not
qualify as an employee for purposes of Title VII. See id. at 214. The court disagreed, applying
Hyland's per se rule that "'having made the election to incorporate,' the defendant professional
corporation could not later call itself a partnership in substance." Id. at 215 (quoting Hyland,
794 F.2d at 798). The court therefore held that "where defendant is admittedly a professional
corporation of which plaintiff is a non-equity partner, plaintiff is a corporate employee for Title
VII purposes." Id.
In another case, Johnson v. Cooper, Deans & Cargill, PA., 884 F. Supp. 43, 45 (D.N.H.
1994), the United States District Court for the District of New Hampshire, citing Hyland, held
that a professional corporation shareholder was an employee for purposes of federal employ-
ment discrimination statutes. The defendant professional association argued that it possessed
all the attributes of a partnership despite its corporate form, and that the plaintiff, as a de facto
partner, was an employer rather than an employee. See id. The court disagreed, holding that
"the defendant corporation, having elected to do business in the corporate form, was precluded
from asserting that economic reality entitled it to be treated as a de facto partnership for Title
VII purposes." Id.
109. Compare Zimmerman v. North Am. Signal Co., 704 F.2d 347, 352 (7th Cir. 1983)
(holding that directors are not employees) with EEOC v. Johnson & Higgins, Inc., 91 F.3d 1529,
1537-40 (2d Cir. 1996) (holding that directors can be employees), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 47
(1997).
110. See infra text accompanying notes 111-15 (discussing cases).
11L 704 F.2d 347,352(7th Cir. 1983).
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employees.112 In Chavero v. Local 241, the same court concluded that
"[w]hile courts generally construe the term 'employee' broadly under
[the federal employment discrimination statutes], members of boards
of directors are not employees... under any standards." 3  In
reaching this conclusion, the court emphasized that board members
do not have duties traditionally performed by employees." 4 Likewise,
in McGraw v. Warren County Oil Co., the Court of Appeals for the
Eighth Circuit held that directors of a corporation were not employees
within the meaning of the ADEA.11
Although the Sixth Circuit agreed that directors "have tradi-
tionally been viewed as employer rather than employee positions," the
court warned that directors can become employees for purposes of the
ADEA if "their primary role [is] as employees."16 In EEOC v. First
Catholic Slovak Ladies Ass'n, that court found that directors who
perform duties traditionally performed by employees are employees
under the ADEA."17
The Second Circuit took a stronger stance and held directors of
a corporation to be employees under the ADEA, following a per se rule
that the partnership exemption may never be extended beyond actual
partnerships. In EEOC v. Johnson & Higgins, the EEOC brought an
ADEA action challenging Johnson & Higgins's ("J & H's") mandatory
retirement policy for directors."8 The EEOC argued that the ADEA
was applicable insofar as J & H's directors were also officers of the
corporation. J & H argued for application of the partnership exemp-
tion, maintaining that its directors were co-owners of the company
112. See id.
113. 787 F.2d 1154, 1156(7th Cir. 1986).
114. See id. at 1157.
115. 707 F.2d 990, 991(8th Cir. 1983).
Similarly, the United States District Court for the Central District of California held that
directors and trustees of a performing arts center were not employees for purposes of the ADFA
In Schoenbaum v. Orange County Center for Performing Arts, Inc., 677 F. Supp. 1036, 1038
(C.D. Cal. 1987), the court decided that "[tihe functions performed by the directors in this case,
such as raising capital funds and hiring an executive officer, are more similar to traditional
functions of corporate board of directors than traditional functions of an employee." Noting that
the "determination of whether an individual is an employee does not center on the label given
by the organization, but instead turns on an examination of the facts of each case," the court
concluded that those who perform traditional functions of directors cannot be employees. Id.
Finally, in Lattanzio v. Security National Bank, 825 F. Supp. 86, 90-91 (E.D. Pa. 1993), the
United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania followed Chavero and
Schoenbaum in holding that so long as directors performed traditional director duties, they
cannot be regarded as employees for purposes of the federal employment discrimination stat-
uteb.
116. EEOC v. First Catholic Slovak Ladies Ass'n, 694 F.2d 1068, 1070 (6th Cir. 1982).
117. See id. at 1070. These traditional employee duties included maintaining records,
preparing financial statements, and managing the office. See id.
118. See 91 F.3d 1529, 1533-34 (2d Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 47 (1997).
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and were more like partners than employees"19 Rejecting J & H's
argument for application of an economic reality test, the court strictly
emphasized J & H's chosen form of organization and found that "the
partnership exemption from the ADEA was unavailable to a corporate
enterprise."' ° The court reaffirmed its Hyland holding, where it had
stated that "the partnership exemption is limited to actual de jure
partnerships and would not be extended to closely held corporations
or other organizations whose structure resembles that of a partner-
ship." 21
D. Two Competing Emphases in the Gray Area: Form and
Economic Reality
In summary, when construing "employee" for purposes of fed-
eral employment discrimination statutes, a few courts blindly adhere
to the form of organization. These courts always apply the partner-
ship exemption to entities organized as partnerships,2 2 never to
incorporated entities.m In these circuits, therefore, the applicability
of federal employment discrimination statutes depends solely on how
the parties chose to organize themselves. This per se rule provides
predictability in this murky area of the law and offers parties the
ability to control the application of the federal employment discrimi-
119. See id. at 1534. J & H stressed that its stock was owned almost exclusively by its
directors. Moreover, if a director left the board for any reason, including retirement, he was re-
quired to surrender his stock, which was then allocated to the others. See id. at 1532.
120. Id at 1538.
121. Id. at 1537 (quoting Hyland v. New Haven Radiology Assocs., P.C., 794 F.2d 793, 797
(2d Cir. 1986)). Although the Second Circuit restricted the partnership exemption to actual
partnerships, it recognized that directors can nonetheless be employers, and thus not
employees, for purposes of ADEA coverage. See id. at 1538. Despite this recognition, the court
deemed J & H's directors to be employees. For a discussion of the three-factor test the court
employed in making this finding, see infra note 168.
122. These courts draw a distinct line between who is an employee and who is a partner.
Accordingly, they developed a per se rule under which the concepts of employee and partner are
mutually exclusive. See, e.g., Hishon v. King & Spalding, 678 F.2d 1022, 1028 (11th Cir. 1982)
(stressing the "clear distinction between employees.., and partners"); Burke v. Friedman, 556
F.2d 867, 869 (7th Cir. 1977) ("[We do not see how partners can be regarded as employees
rather than as employers who own and manage the operation of the business."); Holland v.
Ernst & Whinney, 35 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 34,653, at 34,653 (N.D. Ala. Aug. 17, 1984)
('The ADEA applies only to discrimination in the context of employment and has no application
in the context of [a partnership].").
123. When courts choose to emphasize the form of organization, they not only apply the
partnership exemption to partnerships that closely resemble corporations, but also refuse to
apply the exemption to professional corporations and corporations that closely resemble part-
nerships. Indeed, another per se rule exists, pursuant to which some courts refuse to recognize
any corporation as a de facto partnership and, thus, refuse to extend the partnership exemption
beyond actual partnerships. See, e.g., Johnson & Higgins, 91 F.3d at 1529; Hyland v. New
Haven Radiology Assocs., P.C., 794 F.2d 793, 793 (2d Cir. 1986).
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nation statutes. If parties to the formation of a company wish to
avoid ADEA liability as to one another, they need only organize them-
selves as a partnership, not a corporation.124
Most courts reject this per se rule, however, and look beyond
the chosen form to the economic reality of the relationship among the
partners, shareholders, or directors. As a result, these courts do not
always apply the partnership exemption to entities organized as part-
nerships 125 and are often willing to apply the exemption to incorpo-
rated entities."6 In these circuits, application of the exemption thus
depends upon how closely the relationship among the principals re-
sembles that of a true partnership or a "shared enterprise."127
Specifically, these courts focus on the extent to which the partners or
those acting as "partners" own and manage the entity."
124. This theory assumes the parties will consider employment discrimination liability as
to one another when forming the entity. In reality, however, entrepreneurs too often assume
there will always be harmony and consequently do not consider the potential deterioration of
their relationships with each other. Instead, concerns about the relationship with the
government through taxation and their relationship with outsiders through vicarious liability
most often drive their choice of entity. For a discussion of what motivates choice of entity, to
wit, tax and liability, see Thompson, supra note 10, at 929 ("[T]he desire for this new form is not
governance driven, but rather an effort to achieve limited liability from state government and
pass-through tax benefits from the federal government.").
125. While bona fide partners are exempt from ADEA coverage, most courts have been
willing to look beyond the "partnership" label before denying standing. Accordingly, before
applying the partnership exemption to a general partnership, most courts apply an economic
reality test to ensure the "partner" possesses the essential characteristics that make a person a
bona fide partner: ownership, management, and shared profits and losses. See, e.g., Serapion v.
Martinez, 119 F.3d 982, 987 (1st Cir.) ("A court must peer beneath the label and probe the
actual circumstances of the person's relationship with the partnership."), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct.
690 (1997); Caruso v. Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co., 664 F. Supp. 144, 149-50 (S.D.N.Y. 1987)
(applying economic reality test to determine employee status of a partner).
126. While it may be tempting to limit the partnership exemption to actual partnerships,
many courts have been willing to extend the exemption to corporate entities that resemble
partnerships. In doing so, these courts have applied an economic reality test. They often
conclude that the economic reality of a particular corporate entity is such that its shareholders
or directors function as partners and, thus, should be treated as such for purposes of federal
employment discrimination statutes. See, e.g., Devine v. Stone, Leyton & Gershman, 100 F.3d
78, 80-81 (8th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 1694 (1997); Fountain v. Metcalf, Zima & Co.,
P.A., 925 F.2d 1398, 1400-01 (11th Cir. 1991); EEOC v. Dowd & Dowd, Ltd., 736 F.2d 1177,
1178-79 (7th Cir. 1984).
127. See Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 80 (1984) (Powell, J., concurring)
(discussing the key factors of a partnership).
128. "The central concept of general partnerships is co-ownership: all of the partners have
an equal say in the management of the partnership, and each partner shares in the net profits of
the partnership." Harry H. Wel, General Partnerships, in PARTNERSHIPS 1, 5 (Pa. Bar Institute
ed., 1988) (emphasis added). "A partnership interest is comprised of three components: the
right to participate in profits, losses, distributions and proceeds of the partnership ('Economic
Interest'); the right to participate in the management of the partnership ('Management
Interest!); and the ownership share in partnership property as a tenant-in-partnership." In re
Cardinal Indus., Inc., 116 B.R. 964, 970-71 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1990) (emphasis added).
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IV. THE ECONOMIC REALITY OF LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANIES
Just as the ADEA does not explicitly address whether part-
ners, shareholders, or directors are employees, it also does not answer
whether members of an LLC are employees. Moreover, no case law
exists considering LLC members' status under the ADEA.
Consequently, the only guidance comes from the cases applying the
discrimination statutes to other entities such as partnerships and
professional corporations. 2 9
These cases reveal a two-step procedure that courts should use
to analyze the applicability of the ADEA to LLC members.3 0 First,
the court must decide whether the LLC may even argue that its
members are de facto partners and, thus, outside the protection of the
ADEA.131 In other words, the court must first determine whether the
partnership exemption should be applied outside actual partnerships
to LLCs. Second, the court must examine the facts of the particular
case to determine whether the members in question are the
equivalent of bona fide partners. 3 2 In both steps, the court should
focus on the economic reality: first, of members and LLCs generally;
second, of the particular members in question and their relationship
with their LLC.l 33
A. Step One: Members as De Facto Partners
An LLC, if sued by one of its members or former members for
an ADEA violation, will likely assert the applicability of the partner-
ship exemption both to LLCs generally and to itself specifically.
Accordingly, it will argue that its members are de facto partners and
thus lack standing to sue under the ADEA. In response, the ag-
grieved member will likely try to exalt the "corporate form" of the
LLC over its economic substance. He will argue that courts should
not extend the partnership exemption to corporate entities like LLCs
that do not have the partnership label. This argument will probably
find favor in the Second Circuit, which has held that an entity's use of
a corporate form precludes any further judicial inquiry to determine
129. See supra Parts HIA and I.B (discussing the application of the statutes to
partnerships and professional corporations).
130. See Marshall B. Paul et al., Workplace Liability Laws May Affect LLC Use by
Professionals, 1 J. LIMTED LIABnILITY COMPANIES 118, 123-25 (1994) (noting and describing this
two-step analysis).
131 See id. at 124.
132. See id. at 124-25.
133. See infra Part IV.A and IV.B (discussing the application of the two-step test).
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whether the entity is a de facto partnership.'3 The Second Circuit
would, thus, end its inquiry before reaching the second step in the
two-step analysis, finding that the partnership exemption would be
per se inapplicable to LLCs. Consequently, LLC members would have
standing to sue under the ADEA.
Instead of adopting the Second Circuit's label test in the first
part of the analysis, courts should instead focus on the economic real-
ity of LLCs. Label tests are inconsistent with the overwhelming
weight of authority in ADEA cases, which requires courts to look
beyond an individual's job title to determine standing.135 Although
most ADEA cases rejecting label tests consist of business entities
attempting to avoid liability by labeling plaintiffs as something other
than employees, 136 courts should also refuse to use labels to provide
standing to plaintiffs who are not, in substance, employees. The
Seventh, Eighth, and Eleventh Circuits, in Fountain, Devine, and
Dowd respectively, followed this reasoning.3 7 In those three cases,
the courts properly rejected the Second Circuit's label test in favor of
an economic reality test, under which they applied the partnership
exemption to professional corporations.
Courts should follow Fountain, Devine, and Dowd and retain
the discretion to apply the partnership exemption to LLCs. Most
134. See Hyland v. New Haven Radiology Assocs., P.C., 794 F.2d 793, 798 (2d Cir. 1986);
see also EEOC v. Johnson & Higgins, 91 F.3d 1529, 1537 (2d Cir. 1996) (quoting Hyland), cert.
denied, 118 S. Ct. 47 (1997).
135. See supra Part III (discussing various courts' substantive analyses of employment
status for ADEA purposes).
136. See Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 79 n.2 (1984) (Powell, J., concurring)
("FAIn employer may not evade the strictures of Title VII simply by labeling its employees as
'partners.' "); Serapion v. Martinez, 119 F.3d 982, 987 (1st Cir.) ("[P]artnerships cannot exclude
individuals from the protection of Title VII simply by draping them in grandiose titles which
convey little or no substance."), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 690 (1997); Simpson v. Ernst & Young,
100 F.3d 436, 439 (6th Cir. 1996) (noting the district judge's observation that the label of
"partner" did little to describe the actual nature of the plaintiffs employment), cert. denied, 117
S. Ct. 1862 (1997); Caruso v. Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co., 664 F. Supp. 144, 150 ("[The mere
fact that an employee holds a job carrying an impressive title does not mean that this employee
loses the protection of the ADEA.").
137. See Devine v. Stone, Leyton & Gershman, P.C., 100 F.3d 78, 80-81 (8th Cir. 1996)
(holding that looking at the substance of the employment relationship to determine whether an
individual is an employee under Title VII is a better approach than a rigid per se rule that
stresses organizational form over substance because employment relationships vary greatly and
often defy easy categorization), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 1694 (1997); Fountain v. Metcalf, Zima &
Co., PA, 925 F.2d 1398, 1400-01 (11th Cir. 1991) (holding that labels are inadequate because
they provide extremely limited evidentiary value); EEOC v. Dowd & Dowd, Ltd., 736 F.2d 1177,
1178 (7th Cir. 1984) (holding that the role of a shareholder in a professional corporation is far
more analogous to a partner in a partnership than it is to a shareholder of a general corporation
and, hence, should not be treated as an employee for purposes of Title VII).
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LLCs undoubtedly have very few corporate attributes,8 8 as limited
liability is the only corporate characteristic LLCs are likely to ex-
hibit.19 In all other respects, most LLCs closely resemble general
partnerships.140 In particular, the members often directly take part in
management, 4' lack the ability to transfer their interests freely,42
possess the right to cause a dissolution of the entity,43 and share
equally in profits and losses.'" The state statutes under which LLCs
are formed support the strong relationship between LLCs and part-
nerships, as they merely permit entrepreneurs who would otherwise
organize as a partnership to use the corporate form solely to receive
the benefit of limited liability while retaining favorable partnership
tax treatment.145
Courts that unduly emphasize choice of organization may rea-
son that members should not be permitted to take advantage of the
LLC form while avoiding its disadvantages by conveniently claiming
partnership status. As one author has noted, however, this reasoning
138. See Paul, et al., supra note 130, at 124 (noting that "most professional LLCs will likely
be decidedly uneorporate-like in their structure").
139. See id.
140. First, LLCs meet the common law definition of partnership: "A partnership is gener-
ally said to be created when persons join together their money, goods, labor or skill" for profit.
Commissioner v. Tower, 327 U.S. 280, 286 (1946); see 1 ALAN R. BROMBERG & LARRY E.
RIBSTEIN, BROMBERG AND RIBSTEN ON PARTNERSHIP § 1.03, at 1:28 (1997) (discussing the
aggregate approach of common law definition of partnership). Also, as one author noted, "[tlhe
Discussion Draft of the Uniform Limited Liability Company Act is based on a partnership
paradigm." Sandra K Miller, What Standards of Conduct Should Apply to Members and
Managers of Limited Liability Companies?, 68 ST. JoHN's L. REv. 21, 70 (1994). For a complete
discussion of the similarities between partnerships and LLCs and the differences between
corporations and LLCs, see id. at 66-72 (concluding that "the partnership model for standards of
conduct [is] a logical choice for the limited liability company").
141. See id. § 404(aXl), 6A U.L.A. 457 ("[Elach member has equal rights in the
management and conduct of the company's business.").
142. See id. § 502, 6A U.L.A. 468 ("A transfer of a distributional interest does not entitle
the transferee to become or to exercise any rights of a member.").
143. See id. § 602(a), 6A U.LA 474 ("[A] member has the power to dissociate from a limited
liability company at any time, rightfully or wrongfully, by express will... ."); id. § 801(bX3), 6A
U.L-.A 481 (stating that a limited liability company is dissolved, and its business must be wound
up upon dissociation of a member-manager or, if none, a member of an at-will company).
144. See id. § 405(a), 6A U.LA. 459 ("Any distributions made by a limited liability company
before its dissolution and winding up must be in equal shares.").
145. As an example, most existing businesses that reorganize as LLCs were previously
organized as general partnerships, not corporations. See Susan Pace Hamill, The Limited
Liability Company: A Catalyst Exposing the Corporate Integration Question, 95 MICH. L. REV.
393, 404-05 (1996) (showing statistical correlation between rise of LLCs and decline of partner-
ships).
Indeed, LLC governance rules show that an LLC is not as much a corporation as it is a
partnership that is permitted to assume corporate status for liability purposes. See supra notes
11-13 and accompanying text (discussing corporate-type limited liability and tax treatment of
LLCs).
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is specious. 146 An LLC, even if viewed as a partnership, would still
not be absolved of all liability to its members. Members who are
denied protection under the ADEA can usually seek relief for breach
of fiduciary duty by majority members. Although courts have not yet
addressed the extent of the fiduciary duty LLC members owe to one
another, the duty would at least equal that owed to a stockholder in a
close corporation. 147 Certainly, any attempt by the majority members
to "squeeze out" a minority member through compulsory retirement
would be a breach of this fiduciary duty. Although there is little case
law in this area, it seems LLC members who lack standing under the
ADEA would still have an action for breach of fiduciary duty when
they are forced to retire from the LLC.148 Because this cause of action
remains available, applying the partnership exemption to LLC's
would not be inequitable. 49
146. First, the complaining [party] is also enjoying the corporate advantages of limited
liability and lower taxes, therefore, he should not be handed the windfall of an
ADEA... claim. Second, ADEA... liability is not a disadvantage of the corporate
form-it is a disadvantage of being an employer. Persons who are truly the employees
of a P.C. have standing to sue their employer under [the ADEA].
Narducci, supra note 29, at 856 n.113. Although the author was writing in the context of a
professional corporation, his argument is equally applicable to LLCs.
In the case of law firms, these employees would include associates, paralegals, and secretar-
ies.
147. Indeed, some commentators argue that the duty owed by an LLC member to his fellow
members should be that of a partner to his fellow partners: the highest form of fiduciary duty.
See generally Miller, supra note 140, at 21 (concluding that members should owe one another a
partnership-type fiduciary duty).
148. See id.
149. Courts should extend the partnership exemption and narrowly construe "employee"
under the ADEA for other reasons also. The ADEA prohibits discrimination on a ground not
recognized in the Constitution, as age is not a suspect class protected by the Equal Protection
Clause. As the Supreme Court put it, "old age does not define a 'discrete and insular'
group... in need of'extraordinary protection from the majoritarian political process.' Instead,
it marks a stage that each of us will reach if we live out our normal span." Massachusetts Bd. of
Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 313-14 (1976).
As a consequence, the individuals protected by the ADEA differ sharply from those protected
by earlier statutes such as Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1991. In particular, ADEA claims
are most often brought by wealthy, white men. See George Rutherglen, From Race to Age: The
Expanding Scope of Employment Discrimination Law, 24 J. LEGAL STUD. 491, 491 (1995) ("An
examination of empirical data reveals that claims under the ADEA are brought predominantly
by white males who hold relatively high-status and high-paying jobs."). "By every measure,
plaintiffs in ADEA cases are better off than plaintiffs in other employment discrimination
cases." Id. at 509. Claims under the ADEA more closely resemble claims for wrongful discharge
than any other employment discrimination claims. See id. at 516-20 (comparing ADEA claims
to claims of wrongful discharge). Because the ADEA does not protect a disfavored and relatively
powerless minority group from discrimination, one commentator has argued that the ADEA
"can no longer be applied to all of the prohibitions against different forms of discrimination." Id.
at 520-21.
At the very least, courts should strictly construe the ADEA term "employee" so as not to
include the powerful, and predominantly white and male, principals of business organizations.
As more women and minorities become principals in business organizations, courts possibly
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B. Step Two: Applying the Partnership Exemption to a
Particular LLC
The second step of the two-part analysis should also depend on
the economic reality of the relationship between the aggrieved mem-
ber and his LLC. Given that ownership, profit sharing, and manage-
ment are the key elements in distinguishing the corporation and
partnership,150 an economic reality test designed to ascertain the
specific LLC member's right to sue under the ADEA should focus on
the degree to which the member's relationship with the LLC embodies
these elements.15' An analysis of most members' relationship with
should delimit the partnership exemption to effectuate the purpose of Title VII. Courts should
give "employee" a broader interpretation under Title VII than under the ADEA to protect these
disfavored groups. Whether and when courts should recognize a partnership exemption to Title
VII is beyond the scope of this Note, however.
Although Congress did not explicitly define "employee" for ADEA purposes, it has implicitly
revealed an intent not to protect those with power. First, the ADEA contains an exemption for
bona fide executives. See 29 U.S.C. § 631(cXl) (1994) ("Nothing... shall be construed to pro-
hibit compulsory retirement of any employee ... employed in a bona fide executive or a high
policymaking position."). By analogy, if officers, employees who may not own and manage their
companies, are not protected, how can those that own and manage their companies be? Second,
Congress explicitly exempted policy-making state officials from protection. See id. § 630(f)
('[Tihe term 'employee' shall not include.., an appointee on the policymaking level...."),
thereby further indicating that it did not intend to protect those in power. Last, the ADEA is
the only federal employment discrimination statute the coverage of which Congress did not
extend in the Civil Rights Act of 1991. See Judith J. Johnson, Semantic Cover for Age
Discrimination: Twilight of the ADEA, 42 WAYNE L. REV. 1, 3 (1995) ("[In the Civil Rights Act of
1991,] Congress expanded almost all rights protected by federal civil rights statutes. Congress,
however, failed to include the ADEA in the substantive changes made by the Civil Rights Act of
1991."). A strict construction of "employee" under the ADEA in light of the above would
certainly support excluding LLC members from that definition.
150. See supra note 128 (discussing ownership, profit-sharing and management elements of
a partnership). Indeed, profit-sharing and control are the two factors emphasized in the UPA's
test for determining the existence of a partnership. Section 101(4) of the UPA defines part-
nership as "an association of two or more persons to carry on as co-owners a business for profit."
U.P.A. § 101(4), 6 U.L-. 10 (1995). Indeed, two of the most important elements of co-ownership
are profit sharing and control. See generally 1 BROMBERG & RIBSTEIN, supra note 140, § 2.07(b)-
(c), at 2:79 to 2:98 (discussing profit sharing and control sharing).
151. Other tests exist for determining whether a partnership exists. Among these is the
test formerly used by the IRS. See supra note 13 (discussing IRS tests to classify entities for
taxation purposes). Under that test, the IRS regarded LLCs as partnerships, granting them
favored pass-through tax treatment. Although the IRS considered some of the same factors as
the UPA test, its test was not an appropriate standard by which to determine whether an LLC
member was an employee or partner for purposes of the ADEA. A closer examination of the IRS
test illustrates the basis for this conclusion. The IRS examined four characteristics found in a
"pure corporation," which distinguished it from other organizations: (1) continuity of life; (2)
centralization of management; (3) liability for corporate debts limited to corporate property; and
(4) free transferability of interest. See Former Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(a). Centralization of
management was the only factor common to both the IRS and economic reality tests. The
remaining elements of the IRS test did not explore the daily interaction between the entity and
its principals and thus had less relevance in determining LLC members' entitlement to protec-
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their LLCs reveals that most LLC members should not be considered
employees under the ADEA.152
First, LLC members own the business. They each own a share
of LLC property and are entitled to the value, of their shares upon
liquidation. 153 Moreover, members have provided their own risk capi-
tal that can be used in future business endeavors, and their success
depends on their own initiative, unlike employees who are solely
dependent on a salary for their livelihood.
Next, most members, like partners, receive an approximately
equal share of the profits. 154 The members are usually paid according
to a predetermined formula for profit and loss sharing and thus are
co-owners of the business. 55 Finally, in most LLCs, members have
total management power.15 6 Statutory default rules assign all man-
agement function to the members;157 although LLC statutes do pro-
vide an alternative "manager-managed" form, most members will
choose to manage the LLC directly. 58 Even members of LLCs with
centralized management should not necessarily be considered em-
ployees.
First, those LLC members who elect to have separate manag-
ers control the daily operations will likely retain control over impor-
tant management decisions, such as electing the managers. 59 Also,
each member retains the right to dissolve the firm at any time and
tion under ADEA. For example, the availability of limited liability did not reveal how the entity
functioned.
152. Although the typical LLC member should lack standing to sue under the ADEA, the
mere denomination "LLC," like all labels, should not automatically preclude ADEA protection of
LLC members. See infra text accompanying notes 153-55 (stating that LLC members own the
business and receive equal shares of profits, like partners).
153. See U.L.L.CA. § 701(aX1), 6A U.LA. 476 (1995) ("A limited liability company shall
purchase a distributional interest of a member of an at-will company for its fair value.").
154. See id. § 405(a), 6A U.LA 458 ("Any distributions made by a limited liability company
before its dissolution and winding up must be in equal shares.").
155. As with ownership, equal distribution of profits need not exist for members to be
deemed partners under the ADEA. A member who does not share in profits on an approxi-
mately equal basis, however, is unlikely to participate enough to protect herself adequately from
discrimination. Consequently, a member who does not share approximately equally in the
LLC's profits would exhibit a characteristic of an employee.
156. Management should carry the greatest weight in determining whether an LLC mem-
ber should be considered a partner or employee for purposes of the ADEA. The greater the
stratification of control in the LLC, the more likely that those at the lower end of the spectrum
need the protections of the ADEA to shield against discriminatory practices.
157. See id. § 404(a)(1), 6A U.L.A. 457 ("Elach member has equal rights in the
management and conduct of the company's business.").
158. See supra note 15 (discussing statutory provisions allowing choice of forms of govern-
ance).
159. See infra text accompanying note 164 (discussing control retained by members in
manager-managed LLC).
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demand liquidation. 160 Further, even if the purpose of centralized
management is to exclude some members from control, all the mem-
bers should be on notice of possible exclusion from a role in govern-
ance, as management centralization requires unanimous consent.161
Moreover, separation of ownership and management does not neces-
sarily make an LLC less like a partnership; both LLCs and partner-
ships are governed by operating agreements, and even a partnership
agreement may provide for centralized management.
In addition, an LLC's size by itself should not dictate whether
its members are deemed partners under the ADEA.62 Although
maintaining the characteristics of a bona fide partnership may be-
come more difficult as the LLC increases in size, a large LLC will not
necessarily have more corporate governance features.163 Even if a
large LLC has elected an executive committee to oversee day-to-day
operations, its members can control and operate the firm so long as
they retain an equal right to vote on major decisions: admission and
removal of members, compensation, and election of managers.'4
LLCs may, however, be structured like corporations. 6 5 Thus, a
court should not regard all LLCs as de facto partnerships under the
ADEA.16 Instead, just as many courts emphasize economic reality
and reject the conclusion that a person is a bona fide partner merely
because he is classified as a "partner," courts should also consider
each LLC and its members on a case-by-case basis.
In summary, bona fide partners are not considered employees
for purposes of the ADEA, for they manage, control, and own their
business. The management, control, and ownership of most LLCs by
its members more closely resembles that of partnerships than corpo-
160. An LLC agreement cannot provide for centralized management and entity perma-
nence without losing favorable partnership tax treatment. See supra notes 13 and 151
(discussing taxation of LLCs). In other words, a right of easy exit removes the risk of lack of
control over management.
161. See id. § 404(cXl), 6A U.LA. 457 (The only matters of a [limited liability] company's
business requiring the consent of all the members are: (1) the amendment of the operating
agreement.... ."); ad § 203 cmt. ("A company will be member-managed unless it is designated as
manager-managed under Section 203(a)(6) [in the operating agreement].").
162. See Paul, et al., supra note 130, at 125 (arguing that an LLC's size should not control
whether its members are considered to be employees for purposes of discrimination statutes).
163. See id.
164. See id On the other hand, if the members lack that power, the members may be
employees regardless of the size of the firm. See id.
165. See id. at 124 ("For example, many statutes permit LLCs to provide in their operating
agreements that interests can be freely transferred, that members cannot cause a dissolution of
the entity, and that management will be centralized.").
166. Most courts, however, do not even regard all general partnerships as partnerships
under the ADEA either. See supra Part IHA (discussing courts' treatment of partnerships).
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rations. As a result, the use of the corporate form should not preclude
the application of a test to determine the economic reality of the rela-
tionship between the member and the LLC to ascertain if the LLC
member lacks standing under the ADEA because he is more like a
partner than an employee.
C. Members as Employers Even Without Analogy to Partnership
Although application of the partnership exemption to LLCs is
appropriate, one need not extend the partnership exemption to LLCs
to conclude that members lack standing to sue under the ADEA.
Regardless of whether LLC members are "de facto partners," they
clearly more closely resemble employers than employees. Although
the Second Circuit confined the partnership exemption to actual
partnerships, it did recognize that directors of corporations can still
be employers and thus not covered by the ADEA.167 Similarly, LLC
members, even if not considered partners, can still be employers and
thus not employees under the ADEA. In fact, according to the test the
Second Circuit developed in Johnson & Higgins,68 most LLC mem-
bers are employers. First, most members do not undertake
"traditional" employee duties. On the contrary, they own and manage
the company like employers. Also, members do not report to anyone
higher in the hierarchy, for there is no such person. Therefore, under
the Johnson & Higgins test, LLC members are employers and, there-
fore, cannot sue themselves under the ADEA.
V. CONCLUSION
The Second Circuit notwithstanding, most courts appear will-
ing to disregard labels and examine economic reality to determine
whether a partner, shareholder or director is a bona fide owner and
controller of the entity or a mere employee. Accordingly, whether the
entity in question is a partnership, professional corporation, corpora-
167. See EEOC v. Johnson & Higgins, Inc., 91 F.3d 1529, 1538 (2d Cir. 1996) ("While
Hyland prevents J & H from claiming that its directors are 'partners,' that case does not pre-
clude the argument that J & H should be exempt from the ADEA on account of their position as
directors .... If J & Is directors are more akin to employers than employees then they should
be exempt.... .") (emphasis added).
168. The Second Circuit prescribed a three-factor test: "(1) whether the director has
undertaken traditional employee duties; (2) whether the director was regularly employed by a
separate entity; and (3) whether the director reported to someone higher in the hierarchy." Id.
at 1539.
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tion, or LLC, or whether the person is called "partner," "shareholder,"
"director," or "member" should not matter for purposes of the ADEA.
The test should be the same in every case. Examining the economic
reality of the relationship among the partners or members in ques-
tion, courts should consider them employers so long as they have
sufficient ownership and control of their entity, be it a partnership or
LLC. Most LLC members, like most partners, have sufficient owner-
ship and control to be deemed employers and denied standing under
the ADEA.
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